President Trump and the Conduct of Foreign Policy

A large of volume of opinion has been expressed about President Trump’s conduct of foreign policy.  I have often been asked for my views.  Therefore, this short post adds to that volume; but aims to provide clarity by non-partisan simplicity. 

President Trump’s experience in business has guided his conduct of foreign policy.  The “playbook” accepts that competition and cooperation are not mutually-exclusive states in interactions with an actor.  And, if required, threats can be part of the equation.

While promoting American interests first, he accepts that his interlocutors have their own interests, so the probability of success is increased through reciprocity.  This is a transactional approach to moving issues from competition to cooperation (or challenges to opportunities).  Therefore, the strategy is to achieve American interests through disruption, reciprocity and influence using the instruments of national power to achieve the influence.  This has to be rooted in the competitor’s belief that: President Trump is willing to execute any threat he makes during the negotiation, and that he would rather walk-away rather than make, what he considers to be, a bad deal.

The first step is to achieve disruption to the status quo through, considered by some, an extreme, asymmetric act.  This: introduces complexity, creates a dilemma for the competitor, challenges previous assumptions, and removes any linear thought caused by previous thinking and biases.

Disruption, depending on the response, can be followed by the transactional offer of reciprocity (accompanied by some sort of flattery), or a threat.  Both are designed to achieve a negotiation.

An integrated use of the instruments of national power are used as the tools of influence.  The military tool can range from a security guarantee or cooperation (including arms sales) to a military deployment with a threat of employment.  The economic tool can range from the threat of tariffs or sanctions, to the promise of lifting existing tariffs or sanctions.

This form of hard diplomacy is different.   It can be used to negotiate with partners, as well as competitors, and could also be exploited as a counter to “Gray Zone” tactics where a competitor is acting to achieve objectives thought to be below the threshold of traditional deterrence.

US: The Authorization of the Use of Military Force of 2018

On 16 April 2018, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Senator Bob Corker (R-Tennessee) introduced a draft Authorization of the Use of Military Force (AUMF), “To authorize the use of military force against the Taleban, Al Qaida, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and designated associated forces, and to provide an updated, transparent, and sustainable statutory basis for counter-terrorism operations.”

Current US counter-terrorist military operations are conducted under the 2001 and 2002 AUMF’s and Presidential authority granted under Article II of the US Constitution.  The new AUMF is intended to replace the two existing authorizations.

The 2001 AUMF states: “That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons in order to prevent any future act of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”  Over the years, a growing body of opinion has contended that while the 2001 AUMF authorized military action against Al Qaeda (AQ), the Taleban, and others associated with the September 11 attacks against the US, it did not cover action against: AQ-I (which did not exist until 2004) and became IS, or any other actors that have emerged.

The 2002, Iraq-specific, AUMF gave President Bush authority to “defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq implying the state of Iraq (the use of the word “by”), as opposed to non-state actors operating in and from Iraq.”  However, since then it has been argued that it authorizes actions to threats either to or from Iraq, including AQ-I, and then IS.

Over the years, some members of Congress have argued that the AUMF’s should be replaced, but without success.

The Department of Defense position has been consistent.  Any new AUMF should satisfy three conditions:

• All military options should be authorized;
• It cannot be time-restricted; and,
• It cannot be geographically-constrained.

The main points of the draft are:

• It does not restrict military options.
• The authorization is for: the Taleban, Al Qaida, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, and associated forces.  The designated “associated forces” are: Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, Al Shabaab, Al Qaida in Syria (including Al Nusrah), the Haqqani Network, and Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb.  Additions to the “associated forces” can be notified to Congress for consideration.
•  Military force is authorized in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Yemen and Libya. Military force used elsewhere should be notified to Congress within 48 hours of execution with a report detailing its necessity. Comment: The overt authorization by Congress for the use of military force in the designated nations may have negative diplomatic implications if approved.
•  A Presidential report is required, by Congress on 20 January 2022, and every fourth year subsequently, with a proposal to repeal, modify, or leave in place the resolution.  Comment: As 20 January is Presidential Inauguration Day it is likely that this date will have to change.

Even if approved in committee, there is no guarantee that the Senate Majority Leader, Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Ky), will schedule it for debate.