On
19 December 2018, President Trump announced that the Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) had been defeated in Syria and that US forces
would be withdrawn. While not wishing to comment on the politics of
this decision and how it was made, this short initial article
addresses some of the military implications of a US withdrawal.
The
military situation in Syria involves many actors: President Assad’s
Government forces, Syrian anti-Assad forces, ISIS, Al Qaida (AQ),
Hizballah, Iran (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)), Russia,
Turkey, Kurdish forces, and Allied forces (UK, France etc). It also
affects others such as Israel and Iraq. Each of these forces has its
own interests for being involved (for example: defeat of ISIS,
support of Assad, overthrow of Assad, containment of Iran, protection
of Israel, etc). Indeed, many have multiple interests that could
create different problems as the situation changes. Such a complex
situation requires careful actions to influence each actor towards
one’s desired outcome.
Writing
within hours after the ambiguous announcement, it is still unclear as
to what the extent of the US withdrawal will be (nothing has been
posted to the White House or DoD websites). The presence within
Syria is small, but supported by regionally-based assets. While the
physical presence creates influence effects of itself, the military
capabilities generated require the regionally-based force elements
(for example: deterrence, small-scale conventional combat,
unconventional warfare, intelligence, combat search and rescue
(CSAR), close air support (CAS), counter-terrorism direct action, and
training of partner forces).
President
Trump’s announcement only mentioned the defeat of ISIS, and while
they have lost considerable territory and personnel, for many reasons
it can be argued that they not defeated, and not other US interests
in Syria. He also stated that it is time for other countries to take
the burden in Syria. Unfortunately, it cannot be assumed that any
other actors that involve themselves in Syria would share all, or
even some, of the US national interests, for example the safety of
Israel’s border. Indeed, even if a country did share common
interests with the US in Syria, their involvement may be dependent on
capabilities that the US withdraws, for example: intelligence, CAS
and CSAR.
Until
clarification of the withdrawal is provided it is unclear as to how
it will affect the current or prospective actors in the region
militarily, although some are already exploiting the announcement
through international media.
