Sunday, July 31, 2022

TAIWAN: IS 2022 THE CRUCIAL YEAR?



China has been very belligerent recently.  Language used before the war with India in 1962 and with Vietnam in 1979 has been used.  Chinese warships are in Japanese territorial waters near the Senkakus in the East China Sea and Chinese troops are in Indian territory in Ladakh in the Himalayas.  Strong rhetoric has been used directly to President Biden by Chairman Xi about a visit to Taiwan by Speaker Pelosi, where it appears the US has caved under the pressure.  But, why this behaviour.

China is experiencing significant troubles with COVID and its economy.  The real estate market that accounts for c30% GDP is deep in trouble. Investors and companies are leaving and stock on the Hang Seng China Enterprises index lost over 10% last month.  The Bank of International Settlements estimated Chinese debt to be c290% of GDP in late 2020, and it has worsened.  It has even been officially admitted that the 2022 GDP target of 5.5% will be missed.  There have been runs on banks and banking fraud is a major issue.  This is reflecting badly on Xi.

The 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party is due to take place later this year, probably in October or November.  This should have been a simple matter for Xi to be re-elected as Chairman due to the influence of his many supporters in prominent positions and the 2018 change to the CCP Constitution allowing more than two-terms and not having to retire at 68 years old. 

But what does this mean for Taiwan?  Previously, US and Taiwanese officials estimated a Chinese invasion between 2025 and 2030, yet recently that changed to within the next 18 months.  However, with Xi's difficulties, is he looking for an excuse to execute an action from a range of options that he thinks will be popular enough to guarantee him retaining his position: taking over islands near the mainland, through a blockade of Taiwan to a full-scale invasion.  Xi views the US as weak, politically-divided, and with a poor economy.  He is also aware of Taiwan, Japan and Australia increasing their military capabilities.

How much pressure does Xi feel under?  If he feels his position is threatened, he will have to act before the Congress.  It may be a factor in his calculations, but 1 October is National Day, that marks the formal declaration of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949 and the Chinese Communist Party defeat of the Government of the Republic of China and their retreat to Taiwan (Formosa).


For your kind consideration, I would appreciate any support with my cancer expenses: https://gofund.me/e5992c63.


Thursday, July 28, 2022

THE HOUSE OF COMMONS REPORT ON: THE INTEGRATED REVIEW OF DEFENCE, SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY

On 16 Mar 2022, the Cabinet Office published "Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy", followed later in the month by "Defence in a Competitive Age" and the "Defence and Security Industrial Policy", both published by the Ministry of Defence.


Today, 28 July 2022, the House of Commons Defence Committee published a report, "The Integrated Review, Defence in a Competitive Age and the Defence and Security Industrial Strategy", that reviewed implementation and changed circumstances (including Ukraine).  The government has two months to respond to the findings.


The following "Conclusions and Recommendations" were made:

  • There is a need for a New Chapter update to the IR and the Defence Command Paper which takes into account the events in Afghanistan and Ukraine. The document should then set out how the analysis of the strategic context has changed and what decisions in the Command Paper the UK Government is reviewing.
  • Foreign policy decisions and consequent actions by UK Defence need to be supported by the UK public. The lack of organisation round the withdrawal from Afghanistan damaged the Government’s standing. However, so far, engagement with the public on the Russian offensive in Ukraine and British support for Ukraine has been regular and transparent. We welcome this approach: the Government needs to build on this. 
  • We recommend that the MOD publish annual figures for the assistance provided to other Government Departments and to public authorities. This list should include the number of personnel deployed, the length of deployment, the task they were deployed for, the cost of the task and the renumeration received by the Department. Furthermore, we recommend that the MOD commit to publishing its response to the Reserves Review in the Autumn.
  • There is a danger of over-stretch. The Government needs to ensure that the military is properly resourced with both equipment and personnel to carry out the tasks required of it. To do this, we recommend there be a wholesale re-examination of the decisions on capabilities and timeframes within the Defence Command Paper and the decisions taken in it following events in Ukraine.
  • The Government should publish the actions agreed by each of the Departments as a result of the lessons learned exercises which examined the response to the Afghanistan crisis, together with a time frame for implementation. 
  • There are significant challenges to integration but none that concerns us as much as the MOD’s procurement difficulties. For instance, the MOD has made it clear that in order to achieve integration and utilise new technologies, it needs an effective digital network. Without that network, few of the suggested benefits are accrued. Yet its track record in large and complex programmes is abysmal. We recommend that the Government identify those programmes which are critical enablers and ensure there is additional scrutiny of them. Furthermore, it needs to identify international partners with whom it can collaborate on the technologically advanced equipment that the UK Armed Forces require. 
  • As well as an annual report on the implementation of the IR, we recommend the MOD produce an annual evaluation of what has been achieved in their implementation of Defence in a Competitive Age and DSIS. This evaluation should include case studies which demonstrate implementation (examples of integration with other Government Departments, allies and partners, and defence industry). It should also include an account of how certain events have led to a review of thinking and any subsequent decisions made which change previously agreed outcomes. This will allow Parliamentary Committees and the UK public to scrutinise the implementation of the Integrated Review, Defence in a Competitive Age and the Defence Security and Industrial Strategy.

Earlier this week, 26 July 2022, the Secretary of State for Defence, Ben Wallace, stated that the UK needs a bigger army.  He has not yet stated who he will support in the current Conservative Party leadership contest.  Ms Liz Truss, has stated she will increase defence spending to 3% of GDP by the end of the decade, whereas Rishi Sunak has said he views the NATO commitment of 2% of GDP as "a floor not a ceiling" and said that defence spending would rise to 2.5% over time.  Wallace also said that any increase in funding would lead to equipment programmes being bought faster. 

The new Prime Minister/Conservative Party leader will be in office by the time the response to this critical report is due.


For your kind consideration, I would appreciate any support with my cancer expenses: https://gofund.me/e5992c63.