“Deterrence is a
strategy designed to dissuade an adversary from an action not yet taken.”
Bernard Brodie
In the
early hours of 14 April 2018, the US, UK and France conducted coordinated strikes
on targets associated with the Syrian Chemical Weapons (CW) programme. It appears that the enduring political desired
outcome is to deter the use of CW, the military operational objective was to
degrade the capability of the Syrian Armed Forces to use CW, and three tactical
targets were selected to achieve these aims.
Writing less than eight hours after the military action, it is too early
to address the tactical success of degrading Syrian military capability. This early article will address some of the possible
strategic influence effects.
The
strikes in Syria were targeted at the Syrian CW programme; not regime change. They were selected as: proportionate to the desired
outcome, to avoid civilian casualties, and to avoid deliberate targeting of
Russian and Iranian support to the Syrian regime. US, UK and French statements all held Russia
accountable for the activity conducted by the Syrian regime and implied that
further action would be taken in the event of further CW use. It will take time to ascertain whether
President Assad will have been deterred from further use of CW.
Explicit
Russian statements of retaliation have not occurred. Indeed, other official Russian statements range
from stating that retaliation will occur as the Allied action insulted
President Putin and that was “unacceptable”, to the fanciful notion that the
Syrian AD system, without Russian help, shot-down 71 of 103 cruise
missiles! It will interesting to
understand how Putin’s ego and pride has been influenced, and if and how
Russian “Gray Zone” activities are affected outside of Syria.
Official
Iranian statements have condemned the Allied action as aggression to be
countered. However, like Russia
retaliatory actions have not yet taken place.
Outside of Syria, it will be interesting to see if the Allied action has
influenced Iranian perception of President Trump’s opposition to the JCPOA and whether
they should engage in re-negotiation. It
will also be of interest if Iranian support of proxy groups in: Lebanon, Iraq,
Yemen, Bahrain etc, will be affected in the short-term.
A final
thought, is how the Allied action will influence North Korean behavior in the
forthcoming talks with President Trump. North
Korea has assisted Syria in the development of its missiles and WMD programmes
through the Syrian Scientific Research Centre (one of the three selected targets).
It is too
early to assess the influence effects of the Allied action, and if it has
changed the behavior of any party.
Indeed, such a change of intent may only be short-lived. Understanding, and then exploiting, any
behavioural change into a longer-term advantage is critical.
