Syria: Tactical Action for Strategic Influence

“Deterrence is a strategy designed to dissuade an adversary from an action not yet taken.”

Bernard Brodie

In the early hours of 14 April 2018, the US, UK and France conducted coordinated strikes on targets associated with the Syrian Chemical Weapons (CW) programme.  It appears that the enduring political desired outcome is to deter the use of CW, the military operational objective was to degrade the capability of the Syrian Armed Forces to use CW, and three tactical targets were selected to achieve these aims.  Writing less than eight hours after the military action, it is too early to address the tactical success of degrading Syrian military capability.  This early article will address some of the possible strategic influence effects.

The strikes in Syria were targeted at the Syrian CW programme; not regime change.  They were selected as: proportionate to the desired outcome, to avoid civilian casualties, and to avoid deliberate targeting of Russian and Iranian support to the Syrian regime.  US, UK and French statements all held Russia accountable for the activity conducted by the Syrian regime and implied that further action would be taken in the event of further CW use.  It will take time to ascertain whether President Assad will have been deterred from further use of CW.

Explicit Russian statements of retaliation have not occurred.  Indeed, other official Russian statements range from stating that retaliation will occur as the Allied action insulted President Putin and that was “unacceptable”, to the fanciful notion that the Syrian AD system, without Russian help, shot-down 71 of 103 cruise missiles!  It will interesting to understand how Putin’s ego and pride has been influenced, and if and how Russian “Gray Zone” activities are affected outside of Syria.

Official Iranian statements have condemned the Allied action as aggression to be countered.  However, like Russia retaliatory actions have not yet taken place.  Outside of Syria, it will be interesting to see if the Allied action has influenced Iranian perception of President Trump’s opposition to the JCPOA and whether they should engage in re-negotiation.  It will also be of interest if Iranian support of proxy groups in: Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Bahrain etc, will be affected in the short-term.

A final thought, is how the Allied action will influence North Korean behavior in the forthcoming talks with President Trump.  North Korea has assisted Syria in the development of its missiles and WMD programmes through the Syrian Scientific Research Centre (one of the three selected targets).

It is too early to assess the influence effects of the Allied action, and if it has changed the behavior of any party.  Indeed, such a change of intent may only be short-lived.  Understanding, and then exploiting, any behavioural change into a longer-term advantage is critical.