Monday, June 11, 2018

The Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning: Intelligence Challenges


The US Joint Chiefs of Staff has released the Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC) dated 16 March 2018.  “The foundational idea of the JCIC is to enable an expanded view of the operating environment by proposing the notion of a competition continuum.  This competition continuum offers an alternative to the obsolete peace/war binary with a new model of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict.  These are not mutually exclusive conditions.”  “The central idea consists of four interrelated elements that broadly describe how the Joint Fore and its partners can effectively campaign: Understand the Operating Environment, Design and Construct the Campaign, Employ the Integrated Force & Secure Gains, and Assess & Adapt the Campaign.”

Intelligence is “The directed and coordinated acquisition and analysis of information to assess capabilities, intent and opportunities for exploitation by leaders at all levels to further national interest.”[1]

The Operational Environment is: “A composite of the conditions, circumstances and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of commanders.”[2]  Simplistically, the study of the Operational Environment needs to provide the following:

·         What is the current state of the Operational Environment (context)?
o   Who are the actors?  Are they cooperative, competitive or an adversary in some or all issues?
o   Why?
o   What are their goals?
o   What are their capabilities?
o   What is their intent?
o   What and How are their relationships with others?
o   What are their strengths and weaknesses?
o   What is their culture, religion, societal structure etc?
o   What are their operational concepts, doctrine, and tactics, techniques and procedures?

·         What is happening in the operational environment (horizon scanning)?
o   What is changing?
o   Why is it changing?
o   How could it develop?  Is it a risk, threat or an opportunity?

·         That can then lead integrated campaigning design.
o   How do we want the Operational Environment to be (desired outcome)?
o   How do we change the Operational Environment (strategy)?
o   What are the activities of the actors?  Why?
o   To who, what, where, when and how do we apply national instruments of power to influence the actors in order to achieve our desired outcome (ways)?
o   What are our military objectives?
o   What military capabilities and resources do we require (means)?
o   How did our actions influence the operational environment? (Complexity requires continuous assessment for adaptive planning)

“Gray Zone challenges are defined as competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the war and peace duality.”[3]  Therefore, Gray Zone challenges are activities that occur before armed conflict.  Political agitation, terrorist incidents and/or criminal acts etc will be conducted to appear as unrelated activity to each other and the sponsor.  These activities are designed to achieve the maximum progress towards the adversaries political desired outcome below the threshold of conflict.  Care should be taken to detect a “fig-leaf[4]” and Denial[5] and Deception[6].

“Hybrid Warfare incorporates a range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorism acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal behaviour.”[7]  Therefore, they are activities conducted during armed conflict.

Increasing complexity requires intelligence assessment of increasingly greater resolution of the operational environment to enable understanding, rather than just situational awareness.

Integrated campaigning and multi-domain operations will require timely, detailed, and accurate intelligence, in order to achieve desired national outcomes.  The intelligence community needs to adapt to these circumstances.




[1] UK (JDP 2-00)
[2] NATO (AAP-6).
[3] US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) White Paper “The Gray Zone” dated 09 September 2015.
[4] A minor action that could be used as a justification for a larger action.
[5] Actions taken to prevent or impair intelligence collection.
[6] Actions taken to influence an actor as to the wrong adversary course of action.
[7] Frank Hoffman, Potomac Institute of Policy Studies “Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars” dated December 2007.

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