On
27 July 2018, Reuters reported that the US is continuing to try and create a “Middle
East Strategic Alliance (MESA)”; a political and military alliance that
includes the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Egypt and Jordan (also
described as an “Arab NATO”). The
outcome would be to counter Iran and its regional aspirations and actions. The US would also like deeper cooperation on
other issues such as: counter-terrorism, missile defence and training. The report stated that the MESA may be
discussed at a provisionally-scheduled summit on 12-13 October 2018 in
Washington DC. This summit has now been
cancelled. However ,it is reported that
General Anthony Zinni, a former Commander of US Central Command, has been
appointed to achieve progress with the concept and that Gen Zinni will be
making initial visits to the region shortly.
Setting aside the “considerable” political difficulties in this
endeavour, this short article addresses some of the military difficulties that
would need to be overcome.
The ability to operate as a military alliance
requires preparation[1].
The
most efficient and effective way for an alliance to achieve its objectives is
through forces that are interoperable, creating the synergies required for
joint operations. Force elements that
require an assigned battlespace and deconfliction, rather than integration of
activity, can pose a risk to campaign success.
To operate efficiently, the MESA nations will
need to address many issues. These
include:
·
Operational Concepts.
·
Interoperable military
capabilities.
·
Joint doctrine and tactics,
techniques & procedures.
·
Agreed security protocols.
·
Intelligence-sharing.
·
Secure data and
communications.
·
Command and Control (C4I
systems).
·
Tactical Data Links.
·
Joint training.
·
Joint logistics and
sustainment.
For
example, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have expressed interest in buying the Russian
S-400 air defence system. As these
systems cannot, for security reasons, be linked to current US systems possessed
by each country, denying a national Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD)
capability, they will also deny a fully-efficient MESA IAMD capability.
Indeed,
Iran’s regional interventions make good use of proxy forces and irregular
warfare tactics. In the maritime domain,
the GCC navies will have to exercise at dealing with swarm small-boat tactics
and will rely on Western counter-mine warfare capability.
EVEN IF,
these issues can be satisfied, the MESA will not be a capable, integrated force
in the short-term.
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