Current, US activity is rooted in the
Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic construct (including
international pressure, military manoeuvres, sanctions etc). The different messaging across the principal
US players (Trump, McMaster, Mattis, Tillerson, Kelly and Haley) appears to be
a synchronised campaign to create multiple dilemmas in Kim’s thinking and is
geared to influence Kim that President Trump is willing (whether he is or not) to
use military action, and that if that happens the Kim regime will be gone. Kim’s
deterrence options are only relevant if the US, South Korea and Allies are
perceived as unwilling to bear the cost. The
campaign seems to have worked with North Korean envoys around the world asking whether
the US would use a military option as stated.
If deemed credible, such an assessment may even cause some senior
figures to consider breaking with the regime at some point. However, what is the strategy that lies
behind this US activity?
On 15 November 2017, the Washington Post
reported that President Trump asked South Korean President Moon, “Do you have
to re-unify?” Some have described this as
insensitive, especially as President Moon is the son of North Korean refugees
with family still in North Korea. However,
…
Although the situation is complex, the
following are very basic assumptions of the desired national outcomes of North Korea,
South Korea, China and the US:
- · North Korea – re-unification under the Kim regime whilst retaining nuclear weapons as a deterrent.
- · South Korea – re-unification as a de-nuclearised, capitalist democracy.
- · China – a stable peninsular that poses no challenges to China with no US military presence.
- · The US - a de-nuclearised North Korea that does not pose a threat to the US or its interests.
Despite these desired national outcomes, are
there medium-term objectives that all parties could live with?
- · The US has already publicly stated that its aim is a de-nuclearised North Korea that does not pose a threat to the US or its interests; not regime change.
- · China’s desired national outcome can be met if the US objective is met.
- · South Korea, without giving-up on its desired national outcome, may agree to a medium-term objective of a de-nuclearised North Korea that does not pose a threat.
- · The difficulty is North Korea. Would they settle for a security guarantee from the US, backed by China, that they will not be attacked and there will be no attempt at regime change if they de-nuclearise?
In reaching the objectives outlined above, skilful
negotiation (including inducements and pressure) will be required for North and
South Korea to relent on their desired national outcomes. Hence, President Trump and the re-unification
question. Indeed, following the
President Trump meeting with President Xi last week, China announced that would
be sending an envoy to North Korea. And,
it appears North Korea may be open to negotiation. Also on 15 November 2017, the
Korean Workers’ Party newspaper opened with the position that North Korea would
give up nuclear weapons when the US does as the US threatens the North Korean
regime.
Is President Trump successfully practising the “Art
of the Deal”?
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