United States: Authorisation of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

The President of the United States is the sole authority for the use of nuclear weapons.  Options for employment and the launch codes are carried in a briefcase (known as “the Football”) by a military officer who is constantly with the President.  The issue has two elements:

·         Launch on Attack – warning of a launch is transmitted to the President and the Pentagon.  The President would then be formally advised of the options by the Secretary of State for Defense (SecDef) and the Commander of Strategic Command (Comd STRATCOM). A subsequent Presidential order to launch is passed to the SecDef for validation of authenticity and is then passed to the Comd STRATCOM to execute.  The only check on the employment of the weapons would be if the order would be deemed illegal under the Laws of Warfare. However, this is unlikely as this concern would have been raised with the President when advice and discussion of the options took place.

·         First Use – The United States retains the option of First Use as part of its deterrent policy.  However, such an event would be a deliberate planning option.

At present, prompted by animosity by some of President Trump, there is a debate in the United States on changes to the authorisation of the First Use of nuclear weapons.  However, the only formal proposal for changes was proposed in January 2017.  It was sponsored by Edward Markey (D-MA) in the Senate (S.200) and sponsored by Ted Lieu (D-CA) in the House (HR 669) and proposed no first use of nuclear weapons can be authorised unless it is permitted in the Congressional Declaration of War.

As an independent observer, I shall not comment on US constitutional issues or the reasoning behind the current debate.  However, before Congress contemplates any changes there are other issues that to be considered:

• ·         The submitted proposal, and ongioing debate, has not distinguished between strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons.   Non-strategic nuclear weapons are of shorter range and lower-yield and would be employed for tactical use.
• ·         A Declaration of War that imposes constraints not only affects military options but also Interagency influence operations.  This cedes an advantage to the enemy, reduces the effectiveness of elements of national power and would be against US national interests.
• ·         The constraint would also have implications for any partners, whether NATO or another coalition, again limiting military and influence options.  It may also cause concern about US resolve among the partners.  This would be against the US national interest.
• ·         Similarly, it could also adversely affect relationships with nuclear-capable partners and therefore would also be against the national interest.
• ·         A requirement to return to Congress for any amendment or addition to a Declaration of War would negate timeliness and operational security.

In summary, despite changes in the global operational environment and future technologies (eg Hypersonic missiles), any changes to the current arrangements that reduce flexibility are likely to be detrimental to US national interests.