Possible Military Implications of a US Military Withdrawal from Syria

On 19 December 2018, President Trump announced that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) had been defeated in Syria and that US forces would be withdrawn. While not wishing to comment on the politics of this decision and how it was made, this short initial article addresses some of the military implications of a US withdrawal.

The military situation in Syria involves many actors: President Assad’s Government forces, Syrian anti-Assad forces, ISIS, Al Qaida (AQ), Hizballah, Iran (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)), Russia, Turkey, Kurdish forces, and Allied forces (UK, France etc). It also affects others such as Israel and Iraq. Each of these forces has its own interests for being involved (for example: defeat of ISIS, support of Assad, overthrow of Assad, containment of Iran, protection of Israel, etc). Indeed, many have multiple interests that could create different problems as the situation changes. Such a complex situation requires careful actions to influence each actor towards one’s desired outcome.

Writing within hours after the ambiguous announcement, it is still unclear as to what the extent of the US withdrawal will be (nothing has been posted to the White House or DoD websites). The presence within Syria is small, but supported by regionally-based assets. While the physical presence creates influence effects of itself, the military capabilities generated require the regionally-based force elements (for example: deterrence, small-scale conventional combat, unconventional warfare, intelligence, combat search and rescue (CSAR), close air support (CAS), counter-terrorism direct action, and training of partner forces).

President Trump’s announcement only mentioned the defeat of ISIS, and while they have lost considerable territory and personnel, for many reasons it can be argued that they not defeated, and not other US interests in Syria. He also stated that it is time for other countries to take the burden in Syria. Unfortunately, it cannot be assumed that any other actors that involve themselves in Syria would share all, or even some, of the US national interests, for example the safety of Israel’s border. Indeed, even if a country did share common interests with the US in Syria, their involvement may be dependent on capabilities that the US withdraws, for example: intelligence, CAS and CSAR.

Until clarification of the withdrawal is provided it is unclear as to how it will affect the current or prospective actors in the region militarily, although some are already exploiting the announcement through international media.

Attacks Using Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)

On 10 October 2018, FBI Director Christopher Wray testified before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee on “Threats to the Homeland”.  The following is an edited extract from the testimony concerning UAS:

“The threat from UAS in the US is steadily escalating.”  “The FBI assesses that…UAS will be used to facilitate an attack in the US against a vulnerable target, such as a mass-gathering.  This risk has only increased in light of the publicity associated with the apparent attempted assassination of Venezuelan President Maduro using explosives-laden UAS.” 

Some of the subsequent media reporting of this testimony assumes that such attacks are reasonably easy.  This may stem from the number of UAS in commercial use (package deliveries, event filming, geospatial surveillance, pipeline integrity etc) is rapidly expanding.  However, there are many factors that need to be accounted for before UAS can be used in a successful attack.

·         The example of an attack against a mass-gathering would need to take into account such factors as: the weather, environmental conditions, the payload in relation to the density of people at the target, whether navigational line-of-sight is required or is the mass-gathering defined in time and space.  It should also be noted that most media reporting considered a mass-gathering as an event (sporting event etc), but the daily rush-hour at a transit-hub or a regular meeting of a large number of people are also mass-gatherings.  In the case of a mass-gathering, a single UAS may not achieve the required effect for targeting or payload.

·         Discussion has also focussed on chemical or biological attack against a mass-gathering.  In addition to the factors previously mentioned, effective dispersion of the payload is a challenge.  Indeed, creating the desired effect from aerosol dispersal of many agents, not in a enclosed space, would be a challenge.

·         The use of UAS for assassination (eg the alleged attempt on Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro at a military parade on 04 August 2018) also face problems.  Not only is some understanding of the event required in advance, navigational line-of-sight is required to guide the UAS to the target.  The other problems of weather, environmental conditions, and payload also exist.  The growing use of Counter UAS technology will also reduce the likelihood of an effective attack.

While the commentary above relate to the use of single or low-multiple UAS, the use of a swarm of UAS may overcome some attack limitations but also raise a different scale of challenge.  Indeed, the attacker would have to purchase, modify and store x number of UAS, train for the attack, synchronise the swarm during execution and accept a loss of surprise (even though the precise target may not be known).

While terrorist (or criminal) use of UAS for an attack is a growing concern, the mounting of a successful attack faces considerable issues.

Creation of a Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA) - Updated

On 27 July 2018, Reuters reported that the US is continuing to try and create a “Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA)”; a political and military alliance that includes the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Egypt and Jordan (also described as an “Arab NATO”).  The outcome would be to counter Iran and its regional aspirations and actions.  The US would also like deeper cooperation on other issues such as: counter-terrorism, missile defence and training.  The report stated that the MESA may be discussed at a provisionally-scheduled summit on 12-13 October 2018 in Washington DC.  This summit has now been cancelled.  However ,it is reported that General Anthony Zinni, a former Commander of US Central Command, has been appointed to achieve progress with the concept and that Gen Zinni will be making initial visits to the region shortly.  Setting aside the “considerable” political difficulties in this endeavour, this short article addresses some of the military difficulties that would need to be overcome.

The ability to operate as a military alliance requires preparation[1].

The most efficient and effective way for an alliance to achieve its objectives is through forces that are interoperable, creating the synergies required for joint operations.  Force elements that require an assigned battlespace and deconfliction, rather than integration of activity, can pose a risk to campaign success.

To operate efficiently, the MESA nations will need to address many issues.  These include:

·                Operational Concepts.

·                Interoperable military capabilities.

·                Joint doctrine and tactics, techniques & procedures.

·                Agreed security protocols.

·                Intelligence-sharing.

·                Secure data and communications.

·                Command and Control (C4I systems).

·                Tactical Data Links.

·                Joint training.

·                Joint logistics and sustainment.

For example, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have expressed interest in buying the Russian S-400 air defence system.  As these systems cannot, for security reasons, be linked to current US systems possessed by each country, denying a national Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) capability, they will also deny a fully-efficient MESA IAMD capability.

Indeed, Iran’s regional interventions make good use of proxy forces and irregular warfare tactics.  In the maritime domain, the GCC navies will have to exercise at dealing with swarm small-boat tactics and will rely on Western counter-mine warfare capability.

EVEN IF, these issues can be satisfied, the MESA will not be a capable, integrated force in the short-term.

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[1] “If you’re not ready the moment things happen, then you’re irrelevant.” Gen John Amos USMC

Creation of a Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA)

On 27 July 2018, Reuters reported that the US is continuing to try and create a “Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA)”; a political and military alliance that includes the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Egypt and Jordan (also described as an “Arab NATO”).  The outcome would be to counter Iran and its regional aspirations and actions.  The US would also like deeper cooperation on other issues such as: counter-terrorism, missile defence and training.  The report stated that the MESA may be discussed at a provisionally-scheduled summit on 12-13 October 2018 in Washington DC.  Setting aside the “considerable” political difficulties in this endeavour, this short article addresses some of the military difficulties that would need to be overcome.

The ability to operate as a military alliance requires preparation[1].

The most efficient and effective way for an alliance to achieve its objectives is through forces that are interoperable, creating the synergies required for joint operations.  Force elements that require an assigned battlespace and deconfliction, rather than integration of activity, can pose a risk to campaign success.

To operate efficiently, the MESA nations will need to address many issues.  These include:

·                Operational Concepts.

·                Interoperable military capabilities.

·                Joint doctrine and tactics, techniques & procedures.

·                Agreed security protocols.

·                Intelligence-sharing.

·                Secure data and communications.

·                Command and Control (C4I systems).

·                Tactical Data Links.

·                Joint training.

·                Joint logistics and sustainment.

For example, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have expressed interest in buying the Russian S-400 air defence system.  As these systems cannot, for security reasons, be linked to current US systems possessed by each country, denying a national Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) capability, they will also deny a fully-efficient MESA IAMD capability.

Indeed, Iran’s regional interventions make good use of proxy forces and irregular warfare tactics.  In the maritime domain, the GCC navies will have to exercise at dealing with swarm small-boat tactics and will rely on Western counter-mine warfare capability.

EVEN IF, these issues can be satisfied, the MESA will not be a capable, integrated force in the short-term.

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[1] “If you’re not ready the moment things happen, then you’re irrelevant.” Gen John Amos USMC

The Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning: Intelligence Challenges

The US Joint Chiefs of Staff has released the Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC) dated 16 March 2018.  “The foundational idea of the JCIC is to enable an expanded view of the operating environment by proposing the notion of a competition continuum.  This competition continuum offers an alternative to the obsolete peace/war binary with a new model of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict.  These are not mutually exclusive conditions.”  “The central idea consists of four interrelated elements that broadly describe how the Joint Fore and its partners can effectively campaign: Understand the Operating Environment, Design and Construct the Campaign, Employ the Integrated Force & Secure Gains, and Assess & Adapt the Campaign.”

Intelligence is “The directed and coordinated acquisition and analysis of information to assess capabilities, intent and opportunities for exploitation by leaders at all levels to further national interest.”[1]

The Operational Environment is: “A composite of the conditions, circumstances and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of commanders.”[2]  Simplistically, the study of the Operational Environment needs to provide the following:

·         What is the current state of the Operational Environment (context)?

o   Who are the actors?  Are they cooperative, competitive or an adversary in some or all issues?

o   Why?

o   What are their goals?

o   What are their capabilities?

o   What is their intent?

o   What and How are their relationships with others?

o   What are their strengths and weaknesses?

o   What is their culture, religion, societal structure etc?

o   What are their operational concepts, doctrine, and tactics, techniques and procedures?

·         What is happening in the operational environment (horizon scanning)?

o   What is changing?

o   Why is it changing?

o   How could it develop?  Is it a risk, threat or an opportunity?

·         That can then lead integrated campaigning design.

o   How do we want the Operational Environment to be (desired outcome)?

o   How do we change the Operational Environment (strategy)?

o   What are the activities of the actors?  Why?

o   To who, what, where, when and how do we apply national instruments of power to influence the actors in order to achieve our desired outcome (ways)?

o   What are our military objectives?

o   What military capabilities and resources do we require (means)?

o   How did our actions influence the operational environment? (Complexity requires continuous assessment for adaptive planning)

“Gray Zone challenges are defined as competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the war and peace duality.”[3]  Therefore, Gray Zone challenges are activities that occur before armed conflict.  Political agitation, terrorist incidents and/or criminal acts etc will be conducted to appear as unrelated activity to each other and the sponsor.  These activities are designed to achieve the maximum progress towards the adversaries political desired outcome below the threshold of conflict.  Care should be taken to detect a “fig-leaf[4]” and Denial[5] and Deception[6].

“Hybrid Warfare incorporates a range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorism acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal behaviour.”[7]  Therefore, they are activities conducted during armed conflict.

Increasing complexity requires intelligence assessment of increasingly greater resolution of the operational environment to enable understanding, rather than just situational awareness.

Integrated campaigning and multi-domain operations will require timely, detailed, and accurate intelligence, in order to achieve desired national outcomes.  The intelligence community needs to adapt to these circumstances.

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[1] UK (JDP 2-00)

[2] NATO (AAP-6).

[3] US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) White Paper “The Gray Zone” dated 09 September 2015.

[4] A minor action that could be used as a justification for a larger action.

[5] Actions taken to prevent or impair intelligence collection.

[6] Actions taken to influence an actor as to the wrong adversary course of action.

[7] Frank Hoffman, Potomac Institute of Policy Studies “Conflict in the 21^st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars” dated December 2007.

UK: Offensive Cyber Operations Policy

On 23 May 2018, the UK Attorney General, the Rt Hon Jeremy Wright QC MP, gave a speech at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) to inform on the UK interpretation of international law with regard to cyber-attacks.  This expands upon a speech at the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) on 11 January 2017 regarding the UK application of international law on self-defence.  The following are extracts of these speeches.

Let’s look at the IISS speech first:

·         “Under the UN Charter, armed force may be used both pursuant to a Chapter VII authorisation by the UN Security Council and in individual or collective self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.”  Comment: The UK position is that to trigger collective self-defence there does not need to be a direct threat to the assisting state.  However, the state subject to the threat must have sought the assistance of the assisting state(s).  The UK also recognizes humanitarian intervention as a possible legal basis for the use of force in certain exceptional circumstances.

·         “… Article 51 of the UN Charter does not require a state passively to await an attack but includes the “inherent right” … to use force in self-defence against an “imminent” armed attack …”  Comment: there is no accepted UN definition of “imminent”.

·          “Following the [9/11] attacks, the UN Security Council … confirmed that self-defence could be justified in relation to non-state actors.”  “… self-defence is available as a legal basis where the state from whose territory the actual or imminent armed attack emanates is unable or unwilling to prevent the attack or is not in effective control of the relevant part of its territory.”  Comment: the UK formally notified the UN Security Council (03 December 2015) that Article 51 is the legal basis for UK military action in Syria against Daesh.

·         “Where there is an identified direct and imminent threat to the UK or British interests abroad, the UK has always maintained it will take action to counter that threat.”

·          “The absence of specific evidence of where an attack will take place or of the precise nature of an attack does not preclude a conclusion that an armed attack is imminent for the purposes of the exercise of a right of self-defence …”

Turning to the recent RIIA speech:

·         “Cyber space is not – and must never be – a lawless world.  It is the UK’s view that when states and individuals engage in hostile cyber operations, they are governed by law just like activities in any other domain.”

·         “On 26 June 2015, the UN Expert Group, including not just the UK and the US, but also Russia and China, recognized that the UN Charter applies in its entirety to cyberspace.  The Group affirmed the relevance of a state’s inherent right to act in self-defence in response to a cyber operation meeting the threshold of an armed attack.”

·         “… the UK considers it is clear that cyber operations that result in, or present an imminent threat of, death and destruction on an equivalent scale to an armed attack will give rise to an inherent right to take action in self-defence …”

o   “If a hostile state interferes with the operation of one of our nuclear reactors, resulting in widespread loss of life, the fact that the act is carried out by the way of a cyber operation does not prevent it from being viewed as an unlawful use of force or an armed attack against us.”

·         “When states are engaged in an armed conflict, this means that cyber operations can be used to hinder the ability of hostile groups such as Daesh to coordinate attacks, and in order to protect coalition forces on the battlefield.”  Comment: see paragraph below.

·         “In addition, it is also worth stating that, as a matter of law, there is no requirement in the doctrine of countermeasures for a response to be symmetrical to the underlying unlawful act.”  Comment: The UK National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021 states that, “… respond to cyber-attacks in the same way we respond to any other attack, using whichever capability is most appropriate, including an offensive capability.

·         “… attribution of conduct … require a state to bear responsibility in international law for its internationally wrongful acts, and also for the acts of individuals acting under its instruction, direction or control.

·          “… our National Offensive Cyber Programme (NOCP) is building a dedicated capability allowing the UK to act in cyberspace.  Comment: the NOCP is a joint Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ and Ministry of Defence (MoD) partnership.  Detailed liaison with close Allies is critical to ensure deconfliction of cyber operations, and that there is no adverse effect on intelligence collection operations.

On 12 April 2018, Jeremy Fleming, Director of GCHQ, revealed at the CyberUK2018 conference that the UK had conducted a “major offensive cyber campaign” against Daesh.  “These operations have made a significant contribution to coalition efforts to suppress Daesh propaganda, hindered their ability to coordinate attacks, and protected coalition forces on the battlefield."

As well as informing the British public of the legal basis of government policy, the RIIA speech was clearly intended to convey a message to potential hostile actors in order to deter malicious cyber activity.

President Trump and the Conduct of Foreign Policy

A large of volume of opinion has been expressed about President Trump’s conduct of foreign policy.  I have often been asked for my views.  Therefore, this short post adds to that volume; but aims to provide clarity by non-partisan simplicity. 

President Trump’s experience in business has guided his conduct of foreign policy.  The “playbook” accepts that competition and cooperation are not mutually-exclusive states in interactions with an actor.  And, if required, threats can be part of the equation.

While promoting American interests first, he accepts that his interlocutors have their own interests, so the probability of success is increased through reciprocity.  This is a transactional approach to moving issues from competition to cooperation (or challenges to opportunities).  Therefore, the strategy is to achieve American interests through disruption, reciprocity and influence using the instruments of national power to achieve the influence.  This has to be rooted in the competitor’s belief that: President Trump is willing to execute any threat he makes during the negotiation, and that he would rather walk-away rather than make, what he considers to be, a bad deal.

The first step is to achieve disruption to the status quo through, considered by some, an extreme, asymmetric act.  This: introduces complexity, creates a dilemma for the competitor, challenges previous assumptions, and removes any linear thought caused by previous thinking and biases.

Disruption, depending on the response, can be followed by the transactional offer of reciprocity (accompanied by some sort of flattery), or a threat.  Both are designed to achieve a negotiation.

An integrated use of the instruments of national power are used as the tools of influence.  The military tool can range from a security guarantee or cooperation (including arms sales) to a military deployment with a threat of employment.  The economic tool can range from the threat of tariffs or sanctions, to the promise of lifting existing tariffs or sanctions.

This form of hard diplomacy is different.   It can be used to negotiate with partners, as well as competitors, and could also be exploited as a counter to “Gray Zone” tactics where a competitor is acting to achieve objectives thought to be below the threshold of traditional deterrence.

US: The Authorization of the Use of Military Force of 2018

On 16 April 2018, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Senator Bob Corker (R-Tennessee) introduced a draft Authorization of the Use of Military Force (AUMF), “To authorize the use of military force against the Taleban, Al Qaida, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and designated associated forces, and to provide an updated, transparent, and sustainable statutory basis for counter-terrorism operations.”

Current US counter-terrorist military operations are conducted under the 2001 and 2002 AUMF’s and Presidential authority granted under Article II of the US Constitution.  The new AUMF is intended to replace the two existing authorizations.

The 2001 AUMF states: “That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons in order to prevent any future act of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”  Over the years, a growing body of opinion has contended that while the 2001 AUMF authorized military action against Al Qaeda (AQ), the Taleban, and others associated with the September 11 attacks against the US, it did not cover action against: AQ-I (which did not exist until 2004) and became IS, or any other actors that have emerged.

The 2002, Iraq-specific, AUMF gave President Bush authority to “defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq implying the state of Iraq (the use of the word “by”), as opposed to non-state actors operating in and from Iraq.”  However, since then it has been argued that it authorizes actions to threats either to or from Iraq, including AQ-I, and then IS.

Over the years, some members of Congress have argued that the AUMF’s should be replaced, but without success.

The Department of Defense position has been consistent.  Any new AUMF should satisfy three conditions:

• All military options should be authorized;
• It cannot be time-restricted; and,
• It cannot be geographically-constrained.

The main points of the draft are:

• It does not restrict military options.
• The authorization is for: the Taleban, Al Qaida, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, and associated forces.  The designated “associated forces” are: Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, Al Shabaab, Al Qaida in Syria (including Al Nusrah), the Haqqani Network, and Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb.  Additions to the “associated forces” can be notified to Congress for consideration.
•  Military force is authorized in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Yemen and Libya. Military force used elsewhere should be notified to Congress within 48 hours of execution with a report detailing its necessity. Comment: The overt authorization by Congress for the use of military force in the designated nations may have negative diplomatic implications if approved.
•  A Presidential report is required, by Congress on 20 January 2022, and every fourth year subsequently, with a proposal to repeal, modify, or leave in place the resolution.  Comment: As 20 January is Presidential Inauguration Day it is likely that this date will have to change.

Even if approved in committee, there is no guarantee that the Senate Majority Leader, Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Ky), will schedule it for debate.