Benghazi: Repercussions?

On 11/09/2012, a terrorist attack on the US Consulate in Benghazi and, several hours later, a follow-up attack on the nearby Consulate Annex resulted in the death of the US Ambassador to Libya, Christopher Stevens, and fellow Americans Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty.  This was the first death of a serving US Ambasador since 1979.  While the debate in the US continues over an inadequate Administration response to the attacks and whether political considerations have resulted in a cover-up, this article looks at how the perception of the response and debate will be considered by AQ, its franchises and others that are inspired by its ideology.

The issues concerning the US Administration response to the attack falls into two main areas: the reported "narrative" and the lack of a military response.  Both these key issues cannot, however, be viewed in isolation from other Administration policy.

• It seems that, for political reasons, the Obama Administration has decided that ongoing Overseas Contingency Operations against AQ and the death of Bin Laden has reduced the threat significantly and that AQ is close to defeat.  This will allow the President at the end of his current term to declare victory as part of his legacy.  Fortunately, the narrative is flexible depending on how AQ, "Jihadism", threat etc are defined.  But, it is leading the Administration into bizarre contortions of definition about what is or not a terrorist attack (eg the Ft Hood shootings by Maj Hasan Nidal being described as workplace violence) or even whether AQ still exists in certain areas (ISAF this year has been avoiding using the term AQ in describing the targets of operations to evade awkward questions that could be inconvienient in the lead-up to withdrawal next year.  Core AQ, its franchises and inspired followers will draw the perception of weakness from these circumstances.
• The lack of any military response, may have led to the second attack, and the current debate and the US stating that they did not have assets to use for an intervention will be noted for those planning future attacks.  The planned military withdrawal from Afghanistan and the lack of action in Syria will reinforce "Jihadist" perception that the "West" will eventually lose the will to fight and withdraw, such as Somalia, Lebanon, Iraq and the Soviets from Afghanistan.

In summary, the lack of response and the current debate will reinforce "jihadist" perception that the "West's leaders" and their short-term political agenda, reliant on public opinion, will never be able to counter their generational ideological struggle.  This can only lead to more attacks in the future.

Canada: AQ attack plot

On 22/04/2013, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) arrested Chibeb Esseghaier and Raed Jaser, two foreign national students in Canada.  A tip-off from an Imam in late-2011, concerned about the spread of the spread of extremist media, led to the opening of an investigation, Project SMOOTH, by the Canadian authoritiesin Aug 2012.  Subsequently, the Canadians involved the US authorities.  The plot involved an attack on a rail bridge, while Via Rail train would be crossing it, on the Toronto – New York route (AMTRAK is responsible for the US part of the route).  The RCMP described the plotters as receiving direction and guidance from AQ elements in Iran, but that Iran was not involved.

Following the start of the US-led Coalition action in Afghanistan in Oct 2001, members of the senior AQ leadership withdrew.  Some, such as UBL and Ayman al-Zawahiri moved to the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan while others moved to Iran.  Senior AQ leaders such as Abu Muhammed al-Masri, Yasin al-Suri, Sulayman Abu Ghaith, and Abu Hafs al-Mauritania, in early 2002, reportedly formed the “AQ Management Council” after having settled in Iran.  It appears that the Iranian regime and AQ came to an agreement that AQ could have sanctuary if they ceased from conducting operations and recruiting in Iran and inform the authorities of their activity.  Whilst a further member of the AQ Management Council, Saif al-Adel, is reported to have provided support to those who conducted the May 2003 Riyadh Western housing compound attacks, it seems that AQ did limit their activity in Iran to transit and facilitation.

As the investigation continues, and details become public, it will be of considerable interest to those who follow AQ to know about the:

Perpetrators: one had been in Canada 10 yrs the other 5 yrs – were they radicalized before entering Canada? Were they “sleepers”? Where were they radicalized in Canada? Who were they in contact with in Canada? Who were they in contact with in Iran and how? Did they have any contacts elsewhere? Had they made any travel outside of Canada?

Why Canada: why did AQ choose Canada – thought to be easier operating environment? Less chance of a strong response?  An attack on the US would complicate geopolitics for their hosts over other issues (nuclear etc)?

Why an AQ attack from Iran now: regain the responsibility of being the “Vanguard” against the “Far Enemy”?  Success breeds success – new recruits from the “Arab Spring” Zawahiri not fulfilling mantle of UBL’s successor?

Boston: Who did it?

While the investigation continues, many commentators are speculating as to the perpetrators of this terrorist event.  This short post adds to this commentary!

• The Boston Marathon, while a large national event, is not the iconic event that would usually be favoured by international terrorists.

• The 15 April is celebrated as Patriots Day, celebrating the first battles of the American Revolution in 1775.  It is also Tax Day in the US when annual tax submissions have to be filed with Federal authorities.

• Televised footage of the explosions are revealing: it shows white smoke, not black, the sound is more of a rumble than a sharp crack, it shows a low-level of physical damage to property and also that runners and others in close proximity where able to stay on their feet suggests a small blast wave.  This suggests, at this stage, that the explosive may have been a low-explosive, rather than a high explosive (such as TATP, C4, ANFO) that trained Jihadists, or other serious terrorists would have used.

The facts outlined above may suggest that the attack was more likely to have been conducted by a US right-wing extremist.

However, last year an edition of the Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsular (AQAP) online magazine, Inspire, included an article by Abu Musab al-Surri.  Two extracts are below:

•  It is possible for ordinary Resistance fighters among Muslims residing in America and the allied western countries to target them, in order to partake in the Jihad and the Resistance, and to stretch out a helping hand to the Mujihadeen."

• This is done by targeting crowds in order to inflict maximum human losses.  This is very easy since there are numerous such targets, such as crowded sports arenas, annual social events, large international exhibitions, crowded market places, skyscapers, crowded buildings etc."

Therefore, there is also the possibility that the attack was conducted by a US inspired individual, or small group.

Whoever conducted this attack and for whatever motivation will be of concern to US authorities.

North Korea: A “real” Crisis

The recent threats made by North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un, including a nuclear strike against the US, has prompted intensive, high-level diplomacy and even military deployments. However, given the history of the North Korean dynastic leadership, is it a “real” crisis?

Since the creation of the north Korean state, its first leader and Kim Jong Un’s grandfather, Kim Il Sung, have manufactured crises. The US is looked upon as North Korea’s greatest enemy. The current crisis should not be surprise. Kim Jong Un needs to establish himself as leader with: his military and his people, regional leaders (and crises generally occur following a new leader in South Korea) and a major anniversary on 15 April (the birthday of Kim Il Sung).

While North Korea has an active nuclear weapons programme, they have not demonstrated that they have the capability to deliver a nuclear warhead by ballistic missile. The desire for North Korea to achieve a nuclear weapons capability is to deter any external enemy from effecting regime change and a capability to threaten others in order to achieve concessions. Kim Jong Un and his advisers know that use of such a capability would cause the removal of the regime and therefore the threat of use in current circumstances is not deemed credible.

While the US conducted a show of offensive force and has deployed US Navy missile defence assets as a precaution and to reassure local allies, the International Community has generally viewed the “crisis” as a frustrating annoyance rather than a serious threat. Indeed, the International Community ignored the warning to remove diplomatic missions from South Korea. Even China has agreed that they will work with the US to achieve “denuclearisation” of North Korea.

Apart from the movement and preparation for firing of two Musudan ballistic missiles to the coast, no unusual North Korean military or civil defence indicators have been reported. Yet, even if a limited conventional military attack against South Korea were being contemplated, the North Koreans would expect some retaliation.

It assessed that while a missile test firing will probably occur on the 15 April, the rhetoric of Kim Jong Un is just that, rhetoric.

UAV “Drone” Strikes: CIA or US Military

It has been reported that President Obama is considering gradually transferring the non-avowed, but publicly discussed, alleged CIA UAV programme to the US military. This article addresses some implications of such a transfer.

While the President, the Director of the CIA and the President’s Counter-Terrorism Adviser have all acknowledged a “drone” programme that has had considerable success in targeting the AQ senior leadership, none stated that the programme was the responsibility of the CIA. However, globally people believe that the CIA runs such a programme and even the UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights has called the CIA’s drone strikes in Pakistan a violation of international law.

US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has the DoD task to “Synchronize planning of global operations against terrorist networks” but “USSOCOM can execute global operations against terrorist networks when directed to do so by the President or Secretary of Defense”.

So, in the public debate, what issues are being discussed and what are the possible implications of such a transfer:

International Law: It is debatable whether the UN Special Rapporteur is correct in his comment. One responsibility of a sovereign nation is to uphold the law and this includes preventing attacks from its own territory into the territory of another sovereign nation. CIA deniability helps in this regard. It is also debatable whether the Geneva Convention applies as the targets do not wear fixed, distinctive insignia that is recognizable from a distance.

Public Awareness: Many commentators are discussing the concept of greater openness if the programme is transferred to the military. However, there is no reason why this should be the case and indeed it would still be preferable to keep it covert. Much of the debate has also focused on the CIA conducting assassinations. However, the same people that are against “CIA assassination” seem content that if the military conducted the strike, that the “drone” is just another tool in the military toolbox, such as a sniper shooting an individual.

The biggest implication of USSOCOM, as formal military command in the US military structure, is the conduct of strikes outside formal theatres of military operations. This could be interpreted as an act of war (though see above). CIA deniability also helps in this regard. However, with the CIA conducting the strikes, what if an intelligence entity of a foreign government targeted a US individual using a UAV. They could also claim deniability.

In conclusion, I believe that in areas where the US military are engaged in active, overt operations it may be preferable that USSOCOM has the task, but for other areas the CIA has the deniability.

US National Security Strategy

In the past, the United States has thrived when both our nation and our national security policy have adapted to shape change instead of being shaped by it…. Now, we must once again position the United States to champion mutual interests among nations and peoples. (US National Security Strategy, May 2010)

As President Obama finalizes his national security team for his second term in office, I suggest that the US revises, and brings coherence to, its National Security Strategy and the policies that should flow from it. Despite the extract quoted from the last published strategy, recent global threats and challenges have been, and continue to be, plagued by inconsistency and hesitation. This has caused confusion among allies and partners and exploitable space for others to advance agendas in detriment to US interests and the mutual interests it shares with others.

The following are just three broad examples, geographically-dispersed, to illustrate the problem:

Afghanistan: The Taliban have not been defeated, the Afghan security forces are incapable of protecting the country, corruption is rife, factionalism remains unaffected etc. Withdrawal, if it takes place in 2014, will let the country to revert back to its pre-9/11 state, with the likelihood of AQ returning to enjoy safe-haven. Some regional players will continue to use it as a pawn and some are worried about the negative consequences that could follow. It seems ironic that Russia may want the US to remain engaged.

Syria: US inaction may have extended the conflict and has allowed Islamic extremists to gain a major foothold. Iran and Hizballah are involved and worries persist that as the different players gain territory, elements of Syria’s WMD arsenal could fall into the wrong hands.

North Korea: US policy seems to continue to be reunification with South Korea. The South Koreans do not want this, and even China is now concerned with North Korean behavior. However, the only US response so far is to the North Korean missile threat by announcing an ABM deployment to Alaska at the expense of its NATO allies.

The President’s forthcoming visit to Israel will highlight tensions over the major threat of a nuclear-capable Iran, an issue that has Israel and the Gulf States in agreement!

Further articles will examine global security threats in greater detail.