It has been reported that President Obama is considering gradually transferring the non-avowed, but publicly discussed, alleged CIA UAV programme to the US military. This article addresses some implications of such a transfer.
While the President, the Director of the CIA and the President’s Counter-Terrorism Adviser have all acknowledged a “drone” programme that has had considerable success in targeting the AQ senior leadership, none stated that the programme was the responsibility of the CIA. However, globally people believe that the CIA runs such a programme and even the UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights has called the CIA’s drone strikes in Pakistan a violation of international law.
US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has the DoD task to “Synchronize planning of global operations against terrorist networks” but “USSOCOM can execute global operations against terrorist networks when directed to do so by the President or Secretary of Defense”.
So, in the public debate, what issues are being discussed and what are the possible implications of such a transfer:
International Law: It is debatable whether the UN Special Rapporteur is correct in his comment. One responsibility of a sovereign nation is to uphold the law and this includes preventing attacks from its own territory into the territory of another sovereign nation. CIA deniability helps in this regard. It is also debatable whether the Geneva Convention applies as the targets do not wear fixed, distinctive insignia that is recognizable from a distance.
Public Awareness: Many commentators are discussing the concept of greater openness if the programme is transferred to the military. However, there is no reason why this should be the case and indeed it would still be preferable to keep it covert. Much of the debate has also focused on the CIA conducting assassinations. However, the same people that are against “CIA assassination” seem content that if the military conducted the strike, that the “drone” is just another tool in the military toolbox, such as a sniper shooting an individual.
The biggest implication of USSOCOM, as formal military command in the US military structure, is the conduct of strikes outside formal theatres of military operations. This could be interpreted as an act of war (though see above). CIA deniability also helps in this regard. However, with the CIA conducting the strikes, what if an intelligence entity of a foreign government targeted a US individual using a UAV. They could also claim deniability.
In conclusion, I believe that in areas where the US military are engaged in active, overt operations it may be preferable that USSOCOM has the task, but for other areas the CIA has the deniability.
No comments:
Post a Comment