Possible implications of the new US UAS export policy.

On 17 January 2015, the US State Dept published a Fact Sheet titled "US export policy for Military Unmanned Aerial Systems (MUAS)".  It announced a change in US policy for the sale of such systems, including armed UAS.  To date, the only nation that an armed UAS has been exported to is the UK (MQ-9 Reaper).  The new policy would allow "trusted partner nations" to buy US MUAS, including armed systems, though with the following "potential" requirements:

• Each recipient nation to be required to agree to end-use assurances as a condition of the sale or transfer.
• End-use monitoring and potential additional security conditions to be required.
• All sales and transfers to include agreement to principles for proper use.

Also, each recipient nation has to agree to the following principles guiding proper use before the US will authorize any sale or transfer of MUAS:

• Recipients are to use these these systems in accordance with international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as applicable.
• Armed, and other advanced UAS, are to be used in operations involving the use of force only when there is a lawful basis for use of force under international law, such as national self-defense.
• Recipients are not to use MUAS to conduct unlawful surveillance or use unlawful force against their domestic populations.

It will be of interest, if any further details emerge on this new policy.  But a number of questions arise:

• How are "trusted partner nations" to be defined?  Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have previously been denied export of US MUAS.  Turkey, as a NATO member, may be considered for "trusted partner nation" status, but for national interest, would they use US MUAS against the Kurds.  Would Pakistan use US MUAS against India?  Would Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and the UAE, if given "trusted partner nation" status to fight ISIL use US MUAS against Iran?  This would be in contravention of current US foreign policy.  Indeed, if Iran was not able to discern the origin of such an attack, it may assume it was a covert US or Israeli (who deploy indigenous armed UAS) attack.
• Why are the end-use requirements described as "potential"?  Can they, on a case-by-case basis, be ignored, and why?
• Recipients are not to use MUAS to conduct unlawful surveillance or use of unlawful force against their domestic populations, whose law applies, US or the recipient nation?
• Can the recipient nation use US MUAS against a domestic insurgency or domestic terrorists?  What if the US and the recipient nation disagree on whether possible targets are domestic insurgents or terrorists?
• How will "trusted partner nations" be assessed on targeting intelligence to determine whether they can use US MUAS efficiently?

While MUAS are just another military tool to find/fix, and even finish a target, they have attained a different perception in the minds of many, so it will be of interest if a debate ensues.

ISIL attack Ayn al-Asad Airbase, Iraq

On 12 February 2015, ISIL forces took the town of Khan al-Baghdadi, 100 miles west of Baghdad and 5 miles from the Ayn al-Asad Airbase in Anbar Province, Iraq.  This morning, 13 February 2015, the airbase was attacked by 20-25 ISIL fighters reportedly wearing Iraqi uniforms and some wearing suicide-belts.  They were engaged by Iraqi Security Forces – three detonated their suicide-belts and five were shot dead.

The airbase was captured in 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom and became the largest Coalition base in western Iraq and the second largest US airbase.  The base was officially closed on 31 December 2011.  US forces moved back to the airbase late last year to train the Iraqi Security Forces.

The airbase has come under attack on a number of occasions since December 2014 but, as the debate takes place in the US concerning the passage of an Authorization of Military Force (AUMF) against ISIL, the attack, that had no hope of causing any serious damage, could be sending a number of messages:

1. Refuting President Obama’s claim that airpower and the training of Iraqi forces has halted the ISIL advance.
2. Drawing US forces into combat.
3. A deterrence to Jordan – the airbase is the largest military installation in Anbar Province that borders with Jordan.

4. Showing that US trainers are vulnerable – thus disrupting a major part of current US strategy.
5. Deterring other nations that be consider sending military training teams.
6. A boost to ISIL morale after recent territorial setbacks, such as Kobane.
7. A recruitment drive by showing that they are directly confronting the US.
8. A change of tactic against foreigners in Iraq to offset the lack of hostages for publicity purposes.
 

As the AUMF is debated, ISIL Strategic Communication messaging may dictate tactical engagements.

DIVIDE AND CONQUER: THE ISIL STRATEGY?

On 3 February 2015, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) released a video showing 1^st Lt Moaz al-Kasabeh of the Royal Jordanian Air Force being burnt to death in a cage.  The nature of the death is a change from the beheadings and firing-squads previously shown in ISIL videos.  The video was released during a visit by King Abdullah of Jordan to Washington DC.  In a statement by the Jordanian military, they stated that they believe Lt Kasasbeh was killed on 3 January 2015.

Lt al-Kasasbeh was captured by ISIL after his F-16 was shot-down near Raqqa, Syria on 24 December 2014.  Jordan is a member of the anti-ISIL coalition.  ISIL publicly stated that they would release him if Jordan released Sajida al-Rishawi.  She has been on death-row in Jordan since 2005.  On the 9 November 2005, 60 were killed and 115 injured following suicide bombings at the Grand Hyatt Hotel, the Radisson SAS Hotel and the Days Inn in Amman, Jordan.  Al-Rishawi was captured after her suicide belt failed to detonate at the Radisson SAS – her husband did detonate in the ballroom that was hosting a Jordanian wedding.  This attack was conducted by Al Qaida in Iraq (AQ-I), headed by Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.  AQ-I was the predecessor of ISIL, though ISIL has been disowned by AQ.

The Lt al-Kasasbeh video, like previous productions was very professionally-produced.  Other ISIL media product, such as the magazine Dabiq are also very professional.  They know how to influence and manipulate an audience and monitor international news to exploit it for their own ends.  For example, ISIL offered to release two Japanese hostages, Haruna Yukawa and Kenji Goto, for the sum of $200m.  The sum of $200m was taken from the figure that Japanese Prime Minister Abe promised to aid the Iraqi Government and Syrian refugees.

During January 2015, ISIL were negotiating with the Jordanians over al-Rishawi, when they knew the exchange could not take place as they had already killed Lt al-Kasasbeh.  Therefore, ISIL did not care about the prisoner, only the global publicity they were generating.  To add to this publicity, they were also negotiating with the Japanese over their hostages.  They wished to prolong this publicity and therefore the video of the beheading Haruna Yukawa was released on 24 January 2015 showing a live Kenji Goto.  The video of the Goto beheading was released on 31 January 2015.

So, was this January publicity a build-up for a planned release of the Lt al-Kasasbeh video while King Abdallah was visiting Washington DC?  If so, why?  Did ISIL know that the UAE had stopped flying military missions over Syria following the shoot-down of Lt al-Kasasbeh due to concerns over US Combat Search and Rescue capabilities being based in Kuwait and not in Iraq, where they would be closer for CSAR missions in Syria?  Were they trying to cause a fracture between Jordan and the US, knowing the US policy of “no boots on the ground” to defeat them.  Even though King Abdullah has promised to take the fight to ISIL, the Jordanians will need US support.  They also know that the British Prime Minister has the same “no boots on the ground” policy and no offensive operations in Syria policy, and is unlikely to change them with an election due on (or before) May 2015.

Have the events of the past month been an exercise to further fragment the anti-ISIS coalition?

A battle ahead for an AUMF against ISIL?

On 20 January 2015, in his 2015 State of the Union address, President Obama said “And tonight, I call on Congress to show the world that we are united in this mission by passing a resolution to authorize the use of force against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).”  Previously, the White House has argued that it already has the necessary authority from the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) passed by Congress on 14 September 2001 and signed into law by President Bush on 18 September 2001.

However, the 2001 AUMF states "That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons in order to prevent any future act of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons."  It therefore authorizes military action against Al Qaida (AQ), the Taliiban and others associated with the 11 September 2001 attacks against the US.  As ISIL did not exist in 2001, and is not associated with Core AQ as one of the AQ franchises, it is dubious whether the 2001 AUMF does cover military action against ISIL.

In an interview with Gen Dempsey (CJCS) on 22 January 2015, he endorsed the passing of a new AUMF, but made three important points:

• "I think in the drafting of the AUMF, all options should be on the table, and then we can debate whether we want to use them.  But the authorization should be there."
• "It shouldn't constrain activities geographically, because ISIL knows no boundaries [and] doesn't recognize any boundaries - in fact it's their intention to erase all boundaries to their benefit."
• "Constraints on time, or a "sunset clause", I just don't think it's necessary.  I think the nation should speak of its intent to confront this radical, ideological, barbaric group and leave that open until we can deal with it."

On 28 January 2015, Representative Adam Schiff (D-CA), the Ranking Member on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, introduced a draft AUMF.  It includes the following text:

•  Section 2 (b) – The authority granted in in subsection (a) shall be confined to the territory of the Republic of Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic.  The limitation of this subsection shall not apply to the Armed Forces of the United States engaged in training of indigenous Syrian and regional military forces for the purpose of combating ISIL.
•  Section 2 (c) – No Authorization For Use Of Ground Forces In Combat – The authority granted in subsection (a) does not include the authority for the deployment of ground forces in a combat role.  For the purposes of this subsection, “ground forces in a combat role” does not include special operations forces or other forces that may be deployed in a training, advisory. Or intelligence role.
• ·Section 2 (d) – Termination –The authority granted in subsection (a) shall terminate on the date that is three years after the date of the enactment of this joint resolution.

While the draft AUMF has yet to be debated, a battle over its provisions will not show the world that the US is united and will dismay US allies currently engaged in the Coalition against ISIL.

US Airline Threats - Jan 2015

In the last 10 days, numerous security alerts have been declared concerning US airlines.  The number of security alerts in such a short period is unusual.  The FBI is investigating.

• Sat Jan 17 - A Delta flight, DL1803, from Atlanta International Airport, GE to Raleigh-Durham International Airport, NC was searched on arrival due to a bomb-threat issued on Twitter. Nothing was found.
• Mon Jan 19 - Following a telephoned bomb-threat (saying a pipe-bomb was on board Delta flight DL468) two aircraft were searched at JFK International Airport, NY.  Delta had two flights (using different aircraft) identified as DL468.  The call was received while DL468 from San Francisco, CA to JFK was en-route.  It was searched on arrival at JFK and nothing was found.  DL468 from JFK to Tel Aviv, Israel had boarding halted and was searched.  Again nothing was found.
• Sat Jan 24 - Following bomb-threats posted on Twitter, two aircraft were escorted by South Carolina National Guard F-16s to their destination of Hartfield-Jackson International Airport, Atlanta, GE.  One was a Delta flight, DL1156, from Portland, OR and the second was a SouthWest Airlines flight, SWA2492, from Milwaukee, WI.  Both were searched and nothing was found.  The Twitter account was identified as @KingZortic.  During the exchange on Twitter the poster stated he had done it "for Lulz" (personal comic satisfaction).
• Sun Jan 25 - Following a bomb-threat posted on Twitter, two aircraft were searched on arrival at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, WA.  Jet Blue 1006 was from Long Beach, CA.  The SkyWest flight was from Phoenix, AZ.  Nothing was found.
• Sun Jan 25 - Following a bomb-threat posted on Twitter, a Delta flight, DL1061, from Los Angeles, CA to Orlando, FL was diverted to Dallas TX and searched.  Nothing was found and the flight continued to Orlando.  The Twitter account was identified as Junaid Hussain @AllahAkhbar911 and claimed allegiance to ISIS.

Last month, Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsular (AQAP) posted Issue 13 of their English-language Inspire magazine.  It featured an aircraft on the cover and provided advice on how to build an improvised-explosive device (IED) to attack an aircraft.  It identified US airlines as indirect economic targets.  

While much more information is required to make an initial assessment, from the hypotheses available, the incidents, despite the inconvenience, have not created a climate of fear among the US travelling public.