Possible implications of the new US UAS export policy.

On 17 January 2015, the US State Dept published a Fact Sheet titled "US export policy for Military Unmanned Aerial Systems (MUAS)".  It announced a change in US policy for the sale of such systems, including armed UAS.  To date, the only nation that an armed UAS has been exported to is the UK (MQ-9 Reaper).  The new policy would allow "trusted partner nations" to buy US MUAS, including armed systems, though with the following "potential" requirements:

• Each recipient nation to be required to agree to end-use assurances as a condition of the sale or transfer.
• End-use monitoring and potential additional security conditions to be required.
• All sales and transfers to include agreement to principles for proper use.

Also, each recipient nation has to agree to the following principles guiding proper use before the US will authorize any sale or transfer of MUAS:

• Recipients are to use these these systems in accordance with international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as applicable.
• Armed, and other advanced UAS, are to be used in operations involving the use of force only when there is a lawful basis for use of force under international law, such as national self-defense.
• Recipients are not to use MUAS to conduct unlawful surveillance or use unlawful force against their domestic populations.

It will be of interest, if any further details emerge on this new policy.  But a number of questions arise:

• How are "trusted partner nations" to be defined?  Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have previously been denied export of US MUAS.  Turkey, as a NATO member, may be considered for "trusted partner nation" status, but for national interest, would they use US MUAS against the Kurds.  Would Pakistan use US MUAS against India?  Would Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and the UAE, if given "trusted partner nation" status to fight ISIL use US MUAS against Iran?  This would be in contravention of current US foreign policy.  Indeed, if Iran was not able to discern the origin of such an attack, it may assume it was a covert US or Israeli (who deploy indigenous armed UAS) attack.
• Why are the end-use requirements described as "potential"?  Can they, on a case-by-case basis, be ignored, and why?
• Recipients are not to use MUAS to conduct unlawful surveillance or use of unlawful force against their domestic populations, whose law applies, US or the recipient nation?
• Can the recipient nation use US MUAS against a domestic insurgency or domestic terrorists?  What if the US and the recipient nation disagree on whether possible targets are domestic insurgents or terrorists?
• How will "trusted partner nations" be assessed on targeting intelligence to determine whether they can use US MUAS efficiently?

While MUAS are just another military tool to find/fix, and even finish a target, they have attained a different perception in the minds of many, so it will be of interest if a debate ensues.